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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, Utah, from 
which this appeal arises, is based on U.C.A, § 78-3-4(1) (1953 as amended). Jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Article VIII, 
Section 5 of the Utah State Constitution, U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)0) (1995 Supp.) and Rule 
3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This appeal was assigned to the Utah 
Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
"Hricfcfthe appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under appropriate 
headings and in the order indicated: 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any 
issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on. A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record 
evidence that supports the challenged finding." 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(a)(9) 
"(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal Except in a first appeal of right in a 
criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal taken under these 
rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which may include 
single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the 
prevailing party. The court may order that the damages be paid by the party or by the 
party's attorney. 
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, 
or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not 
based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal, 
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any 
improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or 
gain time that will benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper." 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33 
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"(b) Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other 
paper to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating), an 
attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, 
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances, 
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to 
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; 
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of 
existing law or the establishment of new law; 
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court 
determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may, subject to the conditions 
stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that 
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.55 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11 
"(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. When 
more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple parties are involved, the court 
may direct the entry of a final judgment ^ s4o one or more but fewer than all of the claims 
or parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for 
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such 
determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all 
the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order 
or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment 
adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54(b) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellant's statement of the case, though factually wrong in some places and 
lacking accurate citations, or even any citation at all in other places, nevertheless gives 
enough accurate information that this Court can understand the proceedings and the basis 
of this case. Douglas will use the same abbreviations of names Nipper used, such as 
David E. Nipper, "Nipper," John H. Douglas, "Douglas," the 1999 district court action, 
Judge Frederick Presiding, "Frederick Action," and the action in Sandy, Utah where the 
Ludwigs sued Douglas, et. al, 'Sandy Action." 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Nipper has failed in many respects to properly present and brief the six issues he 
puts forward. This Court, therefore, must reject Nipper's Brief and refiise to consider the 
issues listed, thus affirming the trial court's decision. 
On the merits of the issues, this Court also has reason to affirm the trial court. 
Nipper has already presented and lost on all claims against Douglas in another action. He 
cites no relevant authority for his positions with one exception, and even then fails to 
perform even the most basic analysis. Instead, his brief is full of conclusory statements 
with no factual or legal backing, which this Court cannot use to reverse the trial court. 
Akho&gh Nippen attempts to distinguish two of his claims, 4iis-RICO mdrx&v*} 
conspiracy claims, the fact of the case prove those claims were included in and dismissed 
with prejudice by the Frederick Action, along with the rest of Nipper's claims. 
Nipper also argues res judicata cannot apply to claims he asserts on behalf of the 
Ludwigs. He does not, however, analyze the res judicata effect of the Sandy Case, 
wherein the Ludwigs sued Douglas on the same facts as in this case, on this case. Thus, 
this Court has no basis to overturn the trial court's decision concerning the Ludwigs' 
claims. 
Additionally, the Ludwigs' claims are barred through res judicata because Nipper 
acted as the Ludwigs' privy in the Frederick Action, and presented the same arguments 
on the same claims as he presents on the Ludwigs' behalf in this action. 
Finally, because Nipper provided no just basis for this action and caused needless 
litigation expense, the trial court's award of attorney's fees to Douglas was appropriate. 
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Additionally, this Court should grant attorney's fees for the complete lack of substance in 
Nipper's Brief and the waste of judicial resources to examine this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
Nipper presents six issues for review. Appellant's Br. at L This Court must 
affirm the trial court's decision on all six issues for two reasons, (1) Nipper did not 
present any issue to this Court properly, and (2) each issue fails on its merits. Section I 
below details the presentation inadequacies of each issue, whereas Sections II-IV analyze 
the issues on their merits. Section V explains why this appeal is so egregiously frivolous 
attorney's fees must be awarded to Douglas. 
L NIPPER ¥AILE1> TO PRESENT THE ISSUES PROPERLY 
Each issue submitted to this Court suffers from one or more of the following 
terminal problems: the issue was not presented to the trial court and is presented for the 
first time on appeal; no facts to support the issue were presented to the trial court; the 
issue is moot; the issue was inadequately briefed. As a result, this Court must disregard 
each issue and affirm the trial court's ruling. 
A. This Court must disregard Nipper's first issue. 
Nipper's first issue, "[w]as it reversible error for the District Court to find that Res 
Judicata barred Nipper's/Ludwigs' claims against Douglas when there was and still is no 
final order in the Fredericks Case" (Appellant's Br. at 1), bears two faults. The first fault 
concerns the often-repeated requirement that appealing parties must clearly define the 
issues presented on appeal. Water & Energy Sys. Technology, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, 
Tf20, 48 P.3d 888, 894. The issue as presented does not exist, because neither Douglas 
4 
nor the trial court ever disputed the requirement of a final order in the previous action 
(the Frederick Case) before applying res judicata.1 Moreover, by finding res judicata 
applied to this case the trial court implicitly found that a final order had been entered, 
since both branches of res judicata require a final order in the first action. Sew v. Sec. 
Title Co. of S.Utah, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995) (requiring a final order in the first action 
for issue preclusion to apply); Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'n, Salt Lake City., 
2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642 (requiring a final order in the first action for claim preclusion 
to apply). 
Naturally then this Court should expect Nipper to provide some explanation with 
asg&odt^ and/or citation to the record as to H&y he4>elieves no^finalorder or judgment 
was entered in the Frederick Case, which leads to this issue's second fault. Judge 
Frederick entered an order and judgment on February 12, 2002 making official the 
granting of summary judgment that entirely dismissed Douglas and all claims against him 
from that case. (R. at 604, 607). Appellant's Brief neither cites to that order and 
judgment (or for that matter even acknowledges them) nor explains why they cannot be 
considered final for res judicata purposes. Instead, Nipper leaves it to this Court to 
research and find the pertinent order and judgment and analyze for him whether they are 
final for res judicata purposes. Such an error is cause for this Court to disregard the 
issue. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) ("While failure to cite to 
pertinent authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so when 
1
 In Douglas' memorandum in support of summary judgment Douglas mentioned the 
necessity of a final order for res judicata to apply. (R. at 228). 
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the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court.'5); See also. State v. Shepherd, 989 P.2d 503 (Utah App. 
1999). 
Rule 24(a)(9) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires appellant's brief 
to "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues 
presented... with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305 (quoting Rule 24(a)(9)). "Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not 
just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis 
based on that authority." IdL In Thomas, the appellant Thomas did cite authority on a 
relevant ts^u%but4ii ftofamg s&ore/ IcL Thomas did not analyze whaWhe authority 
requires or how the facts in his case satisfied those requirements. Id. Moreover, Thomas 
ignored several court decisions specifically addressing the issue in question. Id 
In Appellant's Brief in this case, pages 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, and 23, Nipper states 
that no final order exists in the Judge Fredericks case. Yet only once does Nipper attempt 
to explain why he believes that to be true. Appellant's Br. at 14. Under "Summary of 
Arguments/' Nipper explains, "Since the Fredericks Case is not finalized, and Judge 
Fredericks still has discretion to change any of his rulings therein, Claims Preclusion 
cannot apply to any of Nipper's or Ludwigs' claims." Id 
Other than the multiple bald statements that no final order exists in the Judge 
Fredericks case, and the one-sentence analysis just quoted, Appellant's Brief wholly fails 
to explain or provide any authority as to why the Judge Fredericks case is not finalized. 
Just as Thomas failed to analyze legal requirements or explain how the facts satisfy those 
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requirements, Nipper fails to analyze or even cite the requirements of res judicata finality, 
much less apply the facts of this case to those requirements. Also as Thomas did, Nipper 
ignores authority on the issue at hand, even though he was apprised of such authority in 
Douglas' motion for summary disposition to this Court. See, Mem, of P. & A. in Supp. 
of Appellee's Mot, for Summ. Disposition at 4-6. 
Because Appellant's Brief is devoid of any meaningful analysis on the issue of 
finality, and because Nipper fails to cite any authority for his position, this Court should 
refuse to examine the finality issue. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. 
As the issue of finality is the only issue Nipper presents to dispute the dismissal of 
Nipper's Breach of Contract, Theft, EquitablyEstoppel^and. Alter Ego claims, this Court 
should affirm the trial court's dismissal of those claims. As to the other claims, the issue 
of finality of judgment should be considered settled in favor of Douglas. 
B. This Court must disregard Nipper's second issue-
Nipper's second issue, "[w]as it reversible error for the District Court to find that 
Res Judicata barred Nipper's/Ludwigs' claims which were based upon different theories 
and facts (the civil conspiracy and RICO claims/facts), which included those that had 
been obtained by assignment from the Ludwigs" (Appellant's Br. at 2), comprises two 
separate issues. The first asks, does res judicata apply to bar Nipper's claims of civil 
conspiracy and RICO, even though those claims rely on different theories of liability and 
contain different elements than those that were dismissed in the Frederick Case? The 
second asks, does res judicata apply to bar claims assigned to Nipper by the Ludwigs? 
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Of all the issues presented, the first part of issue two comes closest to fulfilling the 
requirement in Thomas to cite authority and facts in the record and to make a reasoned 
analysis, Nipper discusses on pages 21 and 23 of Appellant's Brief why res judicata does 
not apply to his RICO and civil conspiracy claims. On page 21, after quoting three pages 
of Macris & Assocs., Inc. v, Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214, and stating that 
Nipper knew nothing of the possible claims of RICO and civil conspiracy (whether 
Nipper knew of the facts relating to his RICO and civil conspiracy claims is discussed in 
issue 3), Nipper states, 
"Further, even if Nipper had known of the facts supporting the 
RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims, these claims 'rest upon a different set 
afrfeet^2 - dte^atiem of racketeering activity - than that^le^4n^tl>o<>ri^iiai 
Nipper complaint in the Frederick Case. 'Evidence of a different kind or 
character will be necessary to sustain the RICO and Civil Conspiracy 
claims, than the breach of contract litigation' in the Fredericks Case. 
The claims in the Noel Action are not 'identical' to the claims in the 
Fredericks Action." Appellant's Br. at 21. 
Nipper has failed to analyze what constitutes evidence of a different kind or 
character, or what it means to rest upon a different set of facts, which analysis is required 
by Thomas. Nipper also fails as required by Thomas to compare the facts of this case to 
the Macris & Assocs, court's analysis. The Macris & Assocs. court, in explaining how 
the facts and evidence in the two cases involved therein differed, and how there was no 
identity of facts and evidence between the two claims, described (1) the timing of the 
facts (the first case arose from 1989 facts; the second case arose from 1992 facts), (2) the 
circumstances of the facts (the first case arose from the formation of a distributorship 
agreement and the breach thereof; the second case arose from the formation of a new 
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company designed to hinder collection of a judgment in the first case), and (3) the 
specific identity of the facts to the claims in the second action that could not have applied 
to the first set of facts. Macris & Assocs., at f29-30, 16 P.3d at 1221. The Maoris & 
Assocs. court also referenced 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 534 (1994), which fully 
describes the identity of facts or evidence test. Id, at f28, 16 P.3d at 1221. However, 
Nipper makes no mention of that test nor attempts to perform that test. 
Indeed, Nipper is prevented from doing such analysis because all Nipper's claims 
do stem from the same set of facts as analyzed below. Appellant's Br. at 6. By simply 
stating the conclusion that his RICO and civil conspiracy claims rely on evidence of a 
different kind or -^asacter; without analyzing the facts and evidence relating to^th^se 
claims, Nipper again has left the research and analysis up to this Court. As such, this 
issue should be disregarded, being inadequately briefed . Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. 
The second part of the second issue Nipper presents is whether res judicata applies 
to claims obtained by assignment from the Ludwigs. On pages 14, 17, and 23 of 
Appellant's Brief, Nipper refers to the claims of the Ludwigs and explains res judicata 
cannot apply to the Ludwigs' claims because the Ludwigs were not parties to the 
Frederick Action. Appellant's Br. at 14, 17, 23. Both branches of res judicata require the 
Ludwigs or their privy to be a party to the previous action upon which res judicata is 
applied. Sew, 902 P.2d 629; Macris & Assocs., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214. 
Douglas does not deny, and never has denied the Ludwigs were not parties to the 
Frederick Action. But as it pertains to the Ludwigs' claims, res judicata stems both from 
the Sandy case, wherein the Ludwigs sued Douglas on the same facts as involved in this 
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case (R. at 522, 576), and from the fact that Nipper was acting as privy of the Ludwigs in 
the Frederick Action, which is discussed in detail below. 
Appellant's Brief wholly fails to address the Sandy case, and the only mention of 
privity is found on page 17 of Appellant's Brief, where Nipper states, "the Ludwigs are 
not 'Privies' with Nipper." Without any explanation or argument or citation to authority 
as to why the Ludwigs are not privies with Nipper as concerning the Frederick Case, and 
without any argument or citation to authority as to why the Sandy case has no res judicata 
effect on this case, Nipper inappropriately dumps the burden of research and analysis on 
this Court. Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305. Consequently the second part of the second issue 
sboaidaiso be disregarded. Id. 
C. This Court must disregard Nipper's third issue. 
The third issue is, "[w]as it reversible error for the District Court to rule that 
Nipper should have brought claims in the Fredericks Case upon facts and claims that 
Nipper was totally unaware of at the time that he filed his complaint in the Fredericks 
Case?" (Appellant's Br., 2-3). Nipper claims to have raised this issue in the following 
documents: 
• Pl.[4s] Mem. in Opp'n to Def. John Douglas' Mot. for Summ. J. (R. at 336-401) 
• Pi.['s] Mem. (1) in Reply to Def. John Douglas5 Opp'n to Pl.[4s] Mot. for Summ. 
J. (R. at 404-417) 
• PL[4s] Mem. in Opp'n to Def. John Douglas' Mot. for Rule 11 Sanctions (R. at 
512-521) 
• PL['s] Mem. in Supp. of His Mot. for Recons. of Ruling on Summ. J. as to Def. 
John Douglas and for Award of Att'yfs] Fees (R. at 578-589) 
• PL[4s] Mem. in Reply to Def. John Douglas' Opp'n to PL['s] Mot. for Recons. of 
Ruling on Summ. J. as to Def. Douglas and for Award of Att'y[s] Fees (R. at 616-
619) 
10 
• Objection to Proposed Order on Mot. for Recons., and Mot. to Reconsider to 
Either Delay Dismissal Pending Mot. to Consolidate or To Make any Dismissal 
Without Prejudice (R. at 634-636). IdL 
Nowhere in the 120 pages of these six documents did Nipper mention the issue of 
being unaware of facts giving rise to claims brought in this case. Nor has Nipper offered 
any evidence of his being unaware of such facts. The closest he comes is in Appellant's 
Brief, page 6, wherein Nippers states, "Nipper learned for the first time from this Ludwig 
Case that there were others like himself and the Ludwigs." But offers no citation to the 
record for that assertion. In Nipper's facts, [^16 and f21, Nipper again claims not to have 
known about others at the time he filed his complaint. Appellant's Br. at 11, 12. But the 
record to which Nipper cites, R. at 222 and 224, contains no evidence concerning 
Nipper's knowledge or lack thereof of the Ludgwigs and their claims. 
Contrary to Nipper's assertions, the record does show Nipper knew of the civil 
conspiracy claim when he filed his Complaint in the Frederick Action because Nipper 
pled that civil conspiracy in that Complaint. (R. at 468). Also, Nipper knew of the RICO 
claim because in the Judge Fredericks Complaint Nipper referred to Douglas and the 
other defendants "engaging in racketeering activities." IcL 
An appellate court will not consider issues that have no factual or legal support or 
are raised for the first time on appeal. See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; See also, State v. 
Shepherd, 989 P.2d 503 (Utah App. 1999). The courts deem such briefing to be 
inadequate as required by Rule 24(a)(9). Id. Because Nipper never raised this issue 
before presenting it to this Court, and because Nipper offers no factual support or citation 
to the record for support of this issue, and because the record reflects the opposite of 
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Nipper's assertion, this Court should consider the matter inadequately briefed and refiise 
to hear it. 
D. This Court must disregard Nipper's fourth issue. 
Nipper presents as his fourth issue, "[w]as it reversible error for Judge Noel not to 
reverse himself and consider the criminal guilty pleas and/or convictions of Douglas, 
Gent and Nichols as res judicata with respect to the RICO claims and conspiracy claims 
in this lawsuit?" Appellant's Br. at 3. Nipper argues Douglas' plea of guilty to two 
unnamed felonies, as evidenced by a newspaper clipping printed from the internet, 
should have acted as res judicata on Nipper's RICO and civil conspiracy claims. 
Appellant's Br. at 23-24, Addendum Q, R. at 568. 
Nipper fails to explain why a newspaper clipping, which is obviously slanted from 
the prosecutor's perspective, and which does not even mention Nipper or the Ludwigs or 
the 1957 Chevrolet, or even explain what Douglas pled guilty to (Id.), is reliable and 
detailed enough to be recognized as authoritative on the subject of Nipper's RICO and 
civil conspiracy claims. Furthermore, Nipper fails to examine the elements of, and facts 
relating to the crime to which Douglas pled guilty as they compare to his RICO and civil 
conspiracy claims. Such analysis is a necessity for this Court to make a reasoned 
opinion, and as required by Rule 24(a)(9). See Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; See also, 
Shepherd, 989 P.2d at 510. Without more analysis or some authoritative citation or 
To the trial court Nipper stated the felonies were for attempted communications fraud. 
(R. at 584). 
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explanation, this Court cannot possibly rule as a matter of law that Douglas is liable to 
Nipper, and therefore must disregard this issue as well. 
E. This Court must disregard Nipper's fifth issue. 
The fifth issue Nipper presents is, "[w]as it Reversible error to rule that plaintiffs 
claims against Douglas should be dismissed with prejudice, when the Fredericks Case is 
still open and the claims could still be brought in that case?" Appellant's Br. at 4. 
Nipper claims to have preserved this issue in his Objection to Proposed Order on 
Mot. for Recons., and Mot. to Reconsider to Either Delay Dismissal Pending Mot to 
Consolidate or To Make any Dismissal Without Prejudice, located at R. at 634-636. Id. 
>I& thai O^ectk^vNifjper requested the trial court to amend-the Final Ord££ because "[i]f 
the RICO claims against Douglas are dismissed with prejudice, then they could not be 
brought in the Judge Fredericks' action." R. at 634-635. In response to that objection the 
trial court amended the Final Order to read, "[t]his order is not intended to prejudice 
plaintiffs right to move to amend the complaint in Judge Frederick's case, but is in no 
way a comment on the merits of such a motion." R. at 631, 641, 645. The trial court's 
amendment sufficiently eliminated Nipper's concerns of not being able to amend the 
pleadings in the Frederick Action, as even Nipper admits. Appellant's Br. at 24. Nipper 
comments, 
"[i]t appears that Judge Noel agreed with Nipper's objection to the 
Final Order when Judge Noel made a hand-written note that his ruling 
should not preclude any effort to try and consolidate this case with the 
Fredericks Case, or to seek to amend the complaint in the Fredericks Case 
to add these claims." Id. 
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If the trial court agreed with Nipper's objection and made the appropriate 
amendment to the Final Order to satisfy Nipper's concern, it begs the question, why is 
Nipper appealing this issue? Nipper gives the answer to that question in the same 
paragraph just quoted Id The reason: "Just to be sure." Id 
This Court will "refrain from adjudicating issues when the underlying case is 
moot. A case is deemed moot when the requested judicial relief cannot affect the rights 
of the litigants." State Ex Rel. A.E., 2001 UT App 202, f 17, 29 P.3d 31, 35. Because 
amending the order to be without prejudice, as Nipper requests, would not affect Nipper's 
right to amend his complaint in the Judge Frederick case (which is what Nipper is 
concerned with), this Ckwkis f k , ^ with ^ m^KH-issue. As such this Court should i^fram 
from adjudicating the issue. 
F. This Court must disregard Nipper's sixth issue. 
Nipper's final issue is, "[w]as it reversible error for the District Court to grant 
Douglas attorney's fees against Nipper?" Appellant's Br. at 4. In contention against the 
award of attorney's fees Nipper explains to this Court, "Nipper was not in fact precluded 
from raising the claims against Douglas which were pleaded in Nipper's Racketeering 
Complaint herein - and certainly not those of the Ludwigs or the RICO and Civil 
Conspiracy Claims. Consequently,... the awarding of attorney's fees to Douglas should 
be set aside." Appellant's Br. at 24. Again, Nipper fails to cite authority for this 
statement, fails to make any argument except this bald conclusory statement, and fails to 
cite any relevant facts in the case, all of which renders this issue inadequately briefed. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Shepherd, 989 P.2d 510. 
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Furthermore, the trial court did not award attorney's fees solely based on whether 
res judicata applied to the case. R. at 554; Appellant's Br. at Addendum A. Nor does 
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure forbid the granting of fees if the party can 
demonstrate some legal backing for his claims. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure allows sanctions even if a party does have legal backing, if the filing of a 
motion or pleading was for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause 
unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation." The order granting fees 
even refers to the needless increase in the cost of litigation Nipper caused in this case. R. 
at 554; Appellant's Br. at Addendum A. However, Nipper says nothing to this Court 
^tbout ike^aed>or purpose of this litigation. 
Because Nipper makes no argument to dispute the reasons given by the trial court 
for the granting of attorneys fees, and because Nipper offers no citation to rules or other 
authority explaining why the award of attorney's fees should be reversed, this Court 
should disregard this issue along with the other five and affirm the trial court in full. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d at 305; Shepherd, 989 P.2d at 510. Moreover, this Court should grant 
damages for a frivolous appeal according to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (discussed in Section V). 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Douglas analyzes below the issues presented and 
explains why on the merits of the issues this Court must affirm the trial court's rulings. 
The first four issues deal with the application of res judicata to Nipper's various claims, 
and are examined in section II. Sections III and IV discuss issues 5 and 6, regarding 
whether the order should be with prejudice and whether attorneys fees should have been 
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awarded. Finally, section V explains why this Court should grant attorneys fees incurred 
by Douglas in this appeal. 
EL THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
ALL CAUSES OF ACTION 
Nipper separates his claims into three categories 1) the Ludwigs' claims, 2) the 
RICO and Civil conspiracy claims, and 3) all the others, which include Nipper's claims 
of Breach of Contract, Theft, Equitable Estoppel, and Alter Ego. The trial court properly 
dismissed all causes of action against Douglas. 
A. The trial court properly dismissed Nipper's claims of breach of contract, 
theft, equitable estoppel, and alter ego 
NipperV~£laims were*propei&y< dismissed for the following reason^, j*ny'0ne*'«?£ 
which is adequate grounds to affirm the trial court: first, collateral estoppel; second, 
claim preclusion; and third, exclusive jurisdiction. 
Res judicata, which prevents parties from relitigating issues already decided 
between them, embodies two branches or doctrines known as issue preclusion (also 
known as collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion. Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah, 
902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). Both apply to 
this action. 
L Collateral Estoppel 
Collateral estoppel, "prevents the parties from relitigating issues resolved in a 
prior related action." Sevy, 902 P.2d at 632, (citing Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 
1184 (Utah 1993)). For collateral estoppel to apply, four requirements must be met. Id 
at 632. First, "the issue challenged in the case at hand is identical to the issue decided in 
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the previous action. Second, the issue in the previous action must have been decided in a 
final judgment on the merits. Third, the issue in the previous action must have been 
competently, folly, and fairly litigated. Fourth, the opposing party in the action at hand 
must have been either a party or privy to the previous action." Id. Nipper does not 
dispute the first, third, and fourth elements, but argues only the lack of finality of the 
Frederick Action. Appellant's Br. at 15,22,23. The question is whether the order and 
judgment, both entered on February 12, 2002 in the Frederick Action (R. at 604, 607) are 
final for res judicata purposes. 
This Court has adopted the rule that for collateral estoppel purposes, a judgment or 
order is final when entered, until ^versed oe&ppsaV modified, or setiaside in the court of 
rendition. Press Pub., Ltd. V. Matol Botanical Intern., Ltd., 2001 UT 106, 37 P.3d 1121; 
D'Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992); Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246 (Utah 
App. 1987); Copper State Thrift and Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387 (Utah App. 1987). 
The rule was originally applied to find that a bankruptcy order, while not ending the 
bankruptcy case, was nevertheless final for res judicata purposes. Copper State Thrift 
and Loan, 735 P.2d at 390. Though the Frederick Case is not a bankruptcy case, the rule 
set by Copper State Thrift and Loan is nonetheless consistent with the rule in the majority 
of jurisdictions that an order may be final for res judicata purposes even though the case 
remains open and active. Cunningham v. State, 811 P.2d 225 (Wash.App. 1991); 
Carpenter v.Young, 773 P.2d 561 (Colo. 1989). 
Perhaps the most frequent argument against finality is that finality for purposes of 
res judicata is the same as finality for appellate review. Restatement (Second) of 
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Judgments at §13, comment b. The Restatement explains, "that has probably never been 
quite true, and it is surely not true at present." Id. at § 13. "[W]hen res judicata is in 
question a judgment will ordinarily be considered final in respect to a claim . . . if it is not 
tentative, provisional, or contingent and represents the completion of all steps in the 
adjudication of the claim, short of . . . execution or enforcement." Id. at 133. The 
restatement follows Judge Friendly's decision in Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. 
Co., 297 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1961), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 986 (1962), wherein he wrote, 
"Whether a judgment, not 'final' in the sense of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 
[for purposes of appeal], ought nevertheless be considered "final" in the 
sense of precluding further litigation of the same issue, turns upon such 
factors as the nature of the decision (i. e., that it was not avowedly 
tso&s&v^ SW adequacy of the hearing, and the opportunity £er*f6V!kftC. 
'Finality' in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the 
litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no 
really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again." Id. at 89. 
Thus, even if the Copper State Thrift and Loan rule does not apply to this case, 
finality does apply because the order dismissing Douglas and all claims against him from 
the Frederick Action is firm and conclusive. Evidence of such firmness includes the 
denial by Judge Frederick of two motions by Nipper to reconsider. Addendum A; See 
Cunningham v. State, 811 P.2d 225 (Wash.App. 1991) (denying motion to reconsider 
evidence of firmness). Also the order itself demonstrates firmness, stating, "Douglas has 
no personal liability in this matter and therefore this action is dismissed as to Mr. Douglas 
personally and individually." R. at 604. The Judgment states, "[J]udgment is hereby 
granted in favor of Defendant Douglas, and all claims filed against Mr. Douglas, as an 
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individual, are hereby dismissed with prejudice. R. at 607. The wording of the order and 
judgment also demonstrate the conclusiveness of both. 
Treating a firm decision as final for res judicata purposes supports the vital public 
interests served by the doctrine of res judicata as outlined by the United States Supreme 
Court, namely (1) fostering reliance on prior adjudications; (2) preventing inconsistent 
decisions; (3) relieving parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits; and (4) 
conserving judicial resources. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 
308 (1980). 
If Judge Fredericks's decision were not considered final, Mr. Nipper would, as he 
has done, force Douglas to hpmd his time andrmaneyin other cases defending the sair^i 
claims for years until all the litigants and appeals in the Fredericks Action have taken 
their course (already four years running). At the same time Nipper would, as he has 
done, unnecessarily tie up judicial resources in the district and appellate courts. In 
addition Nipper could obtain a judgment inconsistent with the Fredericks Action 
Judgment, which could then lead to a third action to sort it out. Meanwhile, nobody 
could rely on any of the decisions by any of the courts. 
One commentator remarked that the reason for the "firmness" approach in 
applying collateral estoppel, rather than the hard-line ready-for-appeal approach, is "an 
increasing judicial intolerance with efforts to avoid decisions made after fair 
consideration by shifting the scene to another courtroom." IB J. Moore, Federal Practice f 
0.441 [4], at 745 (1983). Surely this case exemplifies that problem, as Nipper filed the 
identical motion for summary judgment in this case just three weeks after Judge 
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Frederick had denied the motion and dismissed with prejudice all claims against Douglas 
in that action. R. at 134,490. 
Even Nipper agrees with this rule when it's in his favor. In Appellant's Brief at 
12, Nipper comments, '"Nipper obtained judgment against Remember When in the 
Fredericks Case, which became Res Judicata as to the facts supporting that judgment," 
even though that judgment has not been certified ready for appeal. Addendum B. 
Consistent with the purposes of res judicata, the Judge Fredericks decision of 
February 12,2002 is final for res judicata purposes and bars Nipper's claims of Breach of 
Contract, Theft, Equitable Estoppel, and Alter Ego. As Nipper has had ample 
^pp^^ i i t ^ i ^p^so i t his case in the Frederick Acti **y ones filing &o$ stxm^a^y judgment 
(R. at 299, 322), once renewing that motion while defending against Douglas' motion for 
summary judgment (R. at 500), and twice requesting reconsideration of the granting of 
summary judgment to Douglas (Addendum A), he cannot now complain about his right 
to a day in court. The judgment in the Frederick Action is final and collateral estoppel 
applies. 
Because collateral estoppel applies to the Breach of Contract, Theft, Equitable 
Estoppel, and Alter Ego claims, the trial court properly dismissed those claims and this 
Court should affirm that decision. In addition to collateral estoppel, claim preclusion 
applies to bar these claims. Either branch of res judicata alone justifies the trial court's 
dismissal of the claims. 
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2. Claim preclusion 
For claim preclusion to apply, three requirements must be met, "First both cases 
must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be 
barred must have been presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should 
have been raised in the first action. Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits." Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f20,16 
P3d 1214,1219 (quoting Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)). 
Concerning the Breach of Contract, Theft, Equitable Estoppel, and Alter Ego 
claims, Nipper again argues only against the third requirement, that the first suit must 
have resulted in a fxnc^judgment mv the merits. Appellant's Br. at 14, 16, 17. 
Both claim preclusion and collateral estoppel serve the same purpose of 
preventing relitigation of issues already decided. Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline, 
913 P.2d 731 (Utah 1995); Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,16 P.3d 
1214. Moreover, both claim preclusion and collateral estoppel serve the same public 
interests of fostering reliance on adjudications, preventing inconsistent decisions, 
relieving parties of vexatious and multiple lawsuits, and conserving judicial resources. 
Office of Recovery Services v. V.G.P., 845 P.2d 944 (Utah App. 1992). Consequently, 
the same test for finality for collateral estoppel purposes should apply for claim 
preclusion purposes. 
Because the judgment in the Frederick Action is final for claim preclusion 
purposes, and because Nipper does not dispute the other requirements of claim 
21 
preclusion, this court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Nipper's Breach of 
Contract, Theft, Equitable Estoppel, and Alter Ego claims based on claim preclusion. 
3- Exclusive Jurisdiction 
Aside from the doctrine of res judicata, another valid reason exists to affirm the 
trial court's order and judgment concerning the claims of Breach of Contract, Theft, 
Equitable Estoppel, and Alter Ego. Under the rules of appellate review, this Court will 
affirm the trial court if it can do so on any ground, even if the trial court assigned an 
incorrect reason for its ruling. Berry v. Berry, 738 P.2d 246 (Utah App. 1987) (affirming 
on res judicata grounds even though the trial court dismissed claims on jurisdictional 
ggieTOads) jd^as^AUphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, 595 P,2d£60^Utafe \9Z9$)cJShus, even 
though the trial court cited res judicata as the reason for dismissing the claims against 
Douglas, this Court may affirm the decision on the grounds of exclusive jurisdiction. 
The Supreme Court of Utah, quoting 15 C J . 1134, has ruled, 
"Where two actions between the same parties, on the same subject, 
and to test the same rights, are brought in different courts having concurrent 
jurisdiction, the court which first acquires jurisdiction, its power being 
adequate to the administration of complete justice, retains its jurisdiction 
and may dispose of the whole controversy, and no court of coordinate 
power is at liberty to interfere with its action." Escalante Co. v. Kent, 7 
P.2d 276, 278 (Utah 1932). 
The policy behind the rule rests on comity and avoidance of conflicting 
judgments. Id, at 278 In Escalante, one case was brought in district court in Salt Lake 
County, the other in district court in Iron County. IdL at 277. The Iron County action was 
filed first, but the Salt Lake County action moved forward and rendered judgment before 
the Iron County court had heard the matter. Id at 277. The Utah Supreme Court 
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reversed the Salt Lake County court's decision and instructed that the Salt Lake County 
action should be stayed until the Iron county action was heard and determined. ta. at 
279. 
Likewise in this case, Nipper initiated two actions between the same parties 
(Nipper and Douglas), on the same subject (the consignment and sale of Nipper's 
vehicle), to test the same rights (Douglas' liability to Nipper through contract and tort), in 
the very same district court in Salt Lake County, in the very same building. (R. at 1, 
463). Accordingly, until Judge Frederick, the judge presiding over the first-filed action, 
had heard and rendered a decision on the entire matter, the trial court in this action must 
have stayed the proceedings a^ toD<M@!asu Judge Noel did so and entered no^decision 
concerning Douglas' liability to Nipper in the matter. See Index, this appeal. 
After Judge Frederick heard the matter and entered a ruling on the entire matter 
concerning Douglas on February 12,2002, the trial court, in accordance with the rule that 
no court of coordinate power is at liberty to interfere with Judge Frederick's decision, 
granted summary judgment to Douglas. R. at 549, 576. Even so, the action was 
essentially stayed further, since no appeal could be taken, and since the trial court could 
change its decision according to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and 
since Nipper would not have to file a new case to pursue the matter further. Only the 
actions of Nipper caused this action to become final pursuant to Rule 54(b) when he filed 
a motion to certify the decision ready for appeal (R. at 559) and when he agreed to the 
Rule 54(b) certification at the hearing on November 1, 2002. R. at 654, p. 18, lines 14-
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2L Otherwise, it is clear from that hearing that the trial court would have continued the 
action without certification. Id. at 654, p. 18. 
A more recent case also reveals the trial court acted properly under the 
circumstances. See Power Train, Inc. v. Stuver, 550 P.2d 1293 (Utah 1976). In Power 
Train, two essentially identical actions were filed, one in California and one later in Utah. 
Id. at 1294. The trial court in Utah dismissed the action, but the Supreme Court of Utah 
reversed explaining that whereas a stay in the Utah action may have been appropriate, a 
dismissal was not because the California action was still pending, and if the California 
court could not resolve all the issues, the statute of limitations could prevent refilling the 
actios* Mir&L 1294r 
In this case, because the two actions were pending in the same district court in the 
same building, the Frederick Action had no greater or less ability to resolve all the issues 
than this action did. Therefore, the trial court had no real reason to continue the action, 
even though it did so in accordance with Power Train. But when Judge Frederick 
resolved all issues pertaining to Douglas by dismissing him from the case with prejudice 
(R. at 604, 607), the trial court was surely no longer required to continue the action and 
was free to dismiss it. Accordingly, this Court may affirm the trial court's decision based 
on the ground of the Frederick Court having exclusive jurisdiction over the matter. 
B. The trial court properly dismissed Nipper's claims of RICO and civil 
conspiracy, 
Nipper argues even if his other claims were properly dismissed, his RICO and 
civil conspiracy claims were not because he had not pled them in the Frederick Action 
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and was not required to include them in that action. Appellant's Br. at 15,17,21,23. 
Nipper's argument fails because he did plead them in the Frederick Action (R. at 468), 
and even if he hadn't, he could have and should have, so when Judge Frederick granted 
summary judgment in favor of Douglas on all claims, that included the RICO and civil 
conspiracy claims. Macris & Assoc, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214. 
1. Cause of Actions Pled 
The fact that Nipper included a claim for civil conspiracy in the Frederick Action 
should not be in dispute, especially considering the Complaint in that action is part of the 
record in this action, which Complaint clearly reads, in large underline print, with the 
words "FIFTi^CAUSE OF.ACTION" over it, "Civil Conspiracy." R. ui 468,•^ferfcwi 
evidence the claims are the same, the defendants who allegedly involved themselves in 
the conspiracy, Douglas, Nichols, and Remember When, are the same in both actions. R. 
at 1,463. Also, the transaction in both cases is the same—the consignment to Remember 
When and the sale to the Ludwigs of Nipper's 1957 black Chevrolet, rated a 10 on a 10-
point scale that was consigned on October 15, 1998. R. at 5, 464. The civil conspiracy 
claim in this action reads, 
"The Racketeering Defendants and each of them agreed on the 
purpose and goal of materially breaching the agreements they had with 
Plaintiff Nipper and the Ludwigs, obtaining Nipper and the Ludwigs money 
and proprietary interests through fraud, committing criminal acts and 
otherwise engaging in racketeering activities in furtherance thereof." R. at 
14. 
Virtually identical to the claim just quoted, the civil conspiracy claim in the 
Frederick Action reads, 
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"The Defendants agreed upon the purpose and goal of materially 
breaching the consignment sales contract, obtaining Nipper's vehicle 
through fraud, committing criminal acts and otherwise engaging in 
racketeering activities in furtherance thereof." R. at 468. 
Why Nipper believes he did not claim civil conspiracy in the Frederick Action or 
that the two civil conspiracy claims are different, he does not say. Nevertheless, the 
record adequately discloses the two claims are the same. Because Civil conspiracy was 
pled in the Frederick Action, when Judge Frederick granted summary judgment on all 
claims in favor of Douglas, that included civil conspiracy and acts as a bar against Nipper 
claiming civil conspiracy in this case. See Argument Section 11(A), supra. The trial 
court's decision to dismiss the action must be affirmed. 
As for Nipper's RICO claim, that too appears to have been pled in the Frederick 
Action. Based on the paragraph just quoted from the Frederick Case, Nipper pled and 
claimed Douglas was "engaging in racketeering activities." R. at 14. In the Complaint in 
this action, in the RICO section, Nipper pled, 
"The Racketeering Defendants . . . conducted the affairs of the 
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity by means of numerous 
violations of mail fraud, wire fraud and Utah State criminal law in inducing 
the Plaintiff Nipper, the Ludwigs and others to enter into agreements 
whereby the Defendants were able to obtain the benefit of money, motor 
vehicles and property interests and retain the same for their own use, all in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. 1962(d)." R. at 13. 
Although the RICO claim as set out in this action is more explicit and cites 
the precise law, both claims clearly allege Douglas engaged in racketeering 
activities, which is the basis of Nipper's RICO claim. Because Nipper already 
pled RICO in the Frederick Action, though less artfully than in this action, that 
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claim too is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, and the trial court's dismissal of 
the claim must be affirmed. See Argument, Section 11(A), supra. 
2. Claim Preclusion 
Assuming civil conspiracy and RICO were not pled in the Frederick Action, they 
are still barred by claim preclusion because they could have and should have been pled in 
the Frederick Action. Macris & Assocs. Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214. 
Once more, the requirements for claim preclusion are, (1) both cases must involve the 
same parties or their privies, (2) the claim that is alleged to be barred must have been 
presented in the first suit or must be one that could and should have been raised in the 
first tsc&on^  and (3)4l*e iksS suit must have resulted in a final judgment on^tke^erite.r MJ; 
at f20, 16 P.3d at 1219. Nipper does not dispute the first requirement (Appellant's Br. at 
11), and the reasoning above concerning the order and judgment of February 12, 2002 in 
the Frederick Action apply here to the third requirement, leaving only the second 
requirement in dispute. Appellant's Br. at 23. 
The Court in Macris & Assocs. analyzed this second requirement and split it into 
two tests: (1) "a party is required to include claims in an action for res judicata purposes 
only if those claims arose before the filing of the complaint in the first action" (Macris & 
Assocs. Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, f25, 16 P.3d 1214, 1220), and (2) "the cause 
of action in the present suit must be identical to the one brought in the prior suit." Id, at 
f28, 16 P.3d at 1221. To determine whether the cause of action is identical, the focus 
must be on whether "[t]he two causes of action rest on a different state of facts and 
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evidence of a different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of action." 
Ii,at_t28, 16P.3datl221. 
Nipper argues Macris & Assocs, supports his argument that (1) because Nipper did 
not know about his RICO and civil conspiracy claims at the time he filed his Complaint 
in the Frederick Action, and (2) because the RICO and civil conspiracy claims rest upon a 
different set of facts and require a different kind of evidence than the Frederick action, 
claim preclusion does not bar Nipper from pursuing RICO and civil conspiracy in this 
action. Appellant's Br. at 21. 
As previously mentioned in Section I of this Brief, there are no facts in this case to 
indicate Nipper did not know ^ bout his RICO m&cwih conspiracy claims when he filed 
the Frederick Action Complaint But even if he did not know, the rule as quoted in 
Macris & Assocs. concerns when the cause of action arose, not whether the party knew 
about the cause of action, despite some wording to suggest otherwise. Macris & Assocs., 
at ^[25, 16 P.3d at 1220. Because Nipper does not deny his RICO and civil conspiracy 
claims arose prior to his filing the Frederick Action Complaint, he should have included 
those claims in that Complaint or lost them, unless they truly do rest upon a different set 
of facts and require a different kind of evidence. Id, at ^|25, 16 P.3d at 1220. 
In Macris & Associates, the Court found no identity of facts and evidence between 
the claims in the first and second actions it was considering. Id., at f 31, 16 P.3d at 122 L 
The second action arose out of the fraudulent formation of a new company, whereas the 
first action arose out of a breach of a distributorship agreement. Id, at f^29-30, 16 P.3d 
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at 122 L Moreover, the second action arose three years after the first action was filed. 
IA, at H129-30, 16 P.3d at 122L 
In this case, Nipper's claims arose out of the consignment on October 15,1998 to 
Remember When and the subsequent sale to the Ludwigs of his 1957 black Chevrolet, 
without Nipper receiving payment. R. at 5. In the Frederick action, Nipper's claims 
arose out of the consignment on October 15, 1998 (the same day) to Remember When 
(the same company) and the subsequent sale to the Ludwigs of his 1957 Chevrolet (the 
same car), without Nipper receiving payment. R. at 464. Although Nipper never 
explains what different kind evidence will be necessary to sustain his RICO and civil 
c<^i^^^wf^kr^m this action, which are based on the^ametea^^^^i^relatmg to his 
1957 Chevrolet, he does mention that in this case he alleges the taking of other people's 
money and vehicles as well as his own. Appellant's Br. at 12 (fact paragraph 23). But 
that alone is not enough to create a different claim to escape res judicata. 
As cited by Macris & Assocs., 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 534 (1994) explains 
whether claims in one action are identical enough to a second action to invoke res 
judicata and bar the second action after judgment is rendered in the first action. It states, 
"the number and variety of the facts alleged do not establish more than one cause of 
action within the rule of res judicata, as long as their result, whether they are considered 
severally or in combination, is the violation of but one right by a single legal wrong." 46 
Am.Jur.2d Judgments § 534 (1994). Hence, the addition by Nipper of the alleged crimes 
against other individuals does not establish more than one cause of action within the rule 
of res judicata for Nipper. Id at § 534. Nipper was injured just once when he failed to 
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receive payment for his car. He suffered a single legal wrong. The fact that others may 
have been injured too by the same defendants does not change the number of times 
Nipper was injured. That number remains at one. 
Because Nipper's RICO and civil conspiracy claims do not rely on evidence of a 
different kind or character than that needed in the Frederick action, and because both 
cases rely on the same essential set of facts and transactions, Nipper's RICO and civil 
conspiracy claims are identical for res judicata purposes to those extinguished by Judge 
Frederick. Therefore, Nipper is barred from asserting those claims in this case. 
C. The trial court properly dismissed the Ludwigs5 claims as presented by 
Nipper. 
Nipper argues res judicata does not apply to the Ludwigs' claims because (a) the 
Ludwigs were not parties to the Judge Frederick case, (b) the Ludwigs are not in privity 
with Nipper, and (c) the order in the Judge Fredericks case is not final. Appellant's Br. 
at 13 (fact paragraph 26), 14, 15, 16, 17, 23. There are two problems with Nipper's 
argument (aside from those explained in section I of this Brief), any one of which defeats 
Nipper's arguments concerning the Ludwigs' claims. First, the Ludwigs were parties to a 
Sandy case against Douglas that concerns the same set of facts as laid out in this case and 
the Frederick Case, yet Nipper fails to address the Sandy case and the preclusive effects 
of that case on this one. Second, Nipper is the Ludwigs' privy as far as the claims 
brought in the Frederick Court. 
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L The Sandy Action 
The Ludwigs sued Douglas in the Sandy division of the Third District Court, case 
number 990407964 asserting the same factual assertions presented by Nipper in this case. 
See Appellant's Br. at 12. Because the Ludwigs were parties to the Sandy Action, both 
branches of res judicata may apply to them and their claims. Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of S. 
Utah, 902 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995); Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'n, Salt Lake City., 
2001 UT 108,44 P.3d 642. In addition, res judicata would apply to the Ludwigs' privies 
and assigns. Culberston v. Board County Commissi, 2001 UT 108,44 P.3d 642. 
Because Nipper claims to have been assigned the Ludwigs' claims (Appellant's Br. at 14-
1S9 ?*?} h& k an assign of the Ludwigs, and rss judicata,-if applied to the Sandy Action, 
would prevent him as the Ludwigs' assign from pursuing their identical claims in this 
action. Culberston v. Board County Commissi 2001 UT 108, 44 P.3d 642. 
The Order on Rule 11 Sanctions, entered on April 9, 2002, plainly refers to the 
Sandy action (as one of the two actions pending concerning the same facts as alleged in 
this case) and states that res judicata applies. R. 553-554. Without some argument from 
Nipper about or reference to the res judicata effect of the Sandy action, this Court has no 
authority to overturn the trial court's determination that res judicata applies to the 
Ludwigs' claims. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) ("While failure to cite 
to pertinent authority may not always render an issue inadequately briefed, it does so 
when the overall analysis of the issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and 
argument to the reviewing court."); See also, State v. Shepherd, 989 P.2d 503 (Utah App. 
1999). 
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2. The Frederick Action 
The only issue relating to the Frederick Action, not addressed to this point, is 
whether res judicata would apply to the Ludwigs as well as Nipper. All other 
requirements of res judicata concerning the claims in the Frederick action have been met, 
as discussed previously. 
Both issue preclusion and claim preclusion apply not only to actual parties in the 
previous action, but also to those in privity. Sew v. Sec. Title Co. of S. Utah, 902 P.2d 
629 (Utah 1995); Culbertson v. Bd. of County Common Salt Lake City., 2001 UT 108, 
44 P.3d 642. "The legal definition of a person in privity with another, is a person so 
identiStdin interest with* another that he represents the same legal right/— Pxess P&&., 
Ltd. v. Matol Botanical Int'l LTD.. 2001 UT 106, ^ 20, 37 P.3d 1121, 1128;. "Thus, 
privity depends mostly on the parties' relationship to the subject matter of the litigation/5 
IdLat^20,37P.3datll28. 
In this case the parties' (Nipper and the Ludwigs) relationship to the subject matter 
of the litigation is practically identical. They are both plaintiffs claiming damages based 
on the sale of Nipper's 1957 black Chevrolet. Appellant's Br. at 11, 12. They are so 
identified with each other that the motion for summary judgment filed in this case was 
applied equally to both Nipper and the Ludwigs without distinction between them. R. at 
500. Nipper made no distinction of claims or theories or damages. R. at 500. Most 
importantly, the same motion for summary judgment was filed in the Frederick Action as 
was filed in this action on the Ludwigs' behalf. R. at 500. 
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Privity also applies when a nonparty (the Ludwigs) exercises control over the 
action upon which res judicata is based (the Frederick Action). 50 C.J.S. Judgment § 
830. Control is determined by examining factors such as whether the same attorney 
appeared in both actions, whether the claims relate to the same property, and whether the 
previous action was "managed as [the party to be bound] thought it should be." Conte v. 
Justice, 996 F.2d 1398, 1403 (2nd Cir. 1993) (quoting Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 265 
N.E.2d 739, 744 (1970)); 50 C J.S. Judgment § 830. 
In this case the same attorney, Brian Steffensen and the Steffensen Law Office, 
represented Nipper in the first action and is representing both Nipper and the Ludwigs in 
this action. R. at 1, 46x^Ilio<dalms$dlateto the same property—the 1957 Chevdekc-
Finally, the Frederick action was managed exactly how the Ludwigs, who are to be bound 
by the judgment in that case, thought it should be, as evidenced by the fact that the same 
motion for summary judgment that was used in the Frederick Action was used on behalf 
of the Ludwigs in this action. R. at 500. Clearly the Ludwigs had control over the 
Frederick Action through their assign, Nipper, and the judgment in that case is binding on 
them. 
On a final note, it has never been established that Nipper had authority to represent 
the Ludwigs in this action. Nipper asserts the Ludwigs assigned him claims "of any 
nature" against Douglas (Appellant's Br. at 12), and cited to the record, page 137, 
wherein Nipper, as part of a memorandum but without evidentiary support, declares he 
was assigned claims from the Ludwigs but does not state what claims those are. Nipper 
also cites "Judicial Notice of Civil No. 990407964," as though this Court must research 
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that voluminous case to discover for itself exactly what claims, if any, the Ludwigs 
assigned to Nipper. Appellant's Br. at 12. Because Nipper has not supplied this Court 
with the appropriate evidence of his ability to stand in for the Ludwigs, this Court could 
dismiss the Ludwigs' claims on that ground. 
III. THE INCLUSION OF "WITH PREJUDICE'1 IN THE 
ORDER IN THIS ACTION WAS PROPER 
Mr. Nipper argues this action must not be dismissed with prejudice because he 
would not be able to amend the Complaint in the Judge Fredericks case to include claims 
of civil conspiracy and RICO. Appellant's Br. at 24. Assuming for this argument those 
claims have not already been pled in that case, amending the order in this case to be one 
without prejudice will have no effect on the Judge Fredericks case. As stated in section I 
of this brief, the trial court already amended the order to remove any such effect. R. at 
640. The only effect changing the Final Order in this case to one without prejudice 
would have would be to allow Nipper to initiate future cases against Douglas. But since 
Nipper has not suggested to this Court an inclination to initiate future lawsuits, this Court 
has no reason to amend the Final Order. 
Even if Nipper did propose future lawsuits, the order from the Judge Fredericks 
case, which dismissed all claims against Douglas with prejudice, acts as a bar to future 
lawsuits, regardless of the Final Order in this case. R. at 604, 607. Consequently the 
term '"with prejudice" in the Final Order merely confirms the dismissal with prejudice of 
all claims against Mr. Douglas in the Judge Frederick action, and nothing more. It would 
be pointless for this Court to affirm the trial court's decision but amend the order. 
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IV. THIS COURT PROPERLY AWARDED RULE 11 SANCTIONS 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 11 allows for sanctions if a pleading or motion is 
presented, "for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation" or if the claims and other legal contentions are 
not warranted by existing law- The fact that no law existed was discussed above. 
Furthermore, evidence of an improper purpose, such as harassment or causing needless 
litigation expense, is as follows: 
• Nipper sued Douglas in this case and the Judge Fredericks case on the same facts, 
claims, and theories R. at 6, 11. 
• Nipper had the Ludwigs assign their Sandy Case claims to him, allowing him, he 
obviously believed, to pair his own claims with the Ludwigs' and pursue them 
again in this action, thus maximizing his opportunities for recovery. R. at 12 
(paragraph 22). 
• Just three weeks after Judge Frederick denied for the second time Nipper's motion 
for summary judgment and granted full summary judgment in favor of Douglas, 
Nipper filed the identical motion for summary judgment from that action in this 
action. R. at 134, 490. 
• Referring to the motions for summary judgment brought in this case and the 
Frederick Case, Nipper explained, "[t]hese are different cases, and each motion 
[for summary judgment] was brought within the framework of that case. R. 514. 
An analysis of the two motions, however, reveals the two were identical except for 
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the case name and number and the addition of the name "Ludwigs" to that of 
"Nipper" throughout the second motion. R. at 500. 
• Nipper asserted he did not bring his RICO and civil conspiracy claims in the 
Frederick Action (Appellant's Br. at 15, 17, 21, 23), but "Civil Conspiracy" is one 
of the claims asserted in the Frederick Action Complaint, and RICO is clearly 
referenced. R. at 468. 
• Nipper argued RICO and civil conspiracy claims require proof of different facts 
and evidence. (Appellant's Br. at 21). However, Nipper requested summary 
judgment on all claims (including the RICO and civil conspiracy claims) in this 
esse based on the same facts and same legal arguments he presented in the 
Frederick Case where, he argues, the RICO and civil conspiracy claims were not 
at issue. R. at 500. 
• At the same time Nipper filed his motion for summary judgment in this case he 
filed a motion for reconsideration in the Frederick Case, and then used that motion 
for reconsideration as an explanation why the Judge Fredericks case was not final 
(and why res judicata did not apply), thus allowing him to move forward on the 
same claims in this case. R. at 513. 
• The official order and judgment in the Judge Fredericks case were entered on 
February 12, 2002. R. at 604, 607. Judge Frederick denied Nipper's motion for 
reconsideration on February 27, 2002. Addendum A. Though Nipper could no 
longer point to a pending motion for reconsideration as the reason no final order 
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existed, he nevertheless moved forward on his breach of contract, theft, and civil 
conspiracy claims in this case. 
• In all, Nipper has filed the same motion for summary judgment six times at the 
trial court level: once in the Frederick Case(R. at 299, 322,); three more times as a 
motion for reconsideration in that case (R. at 500; Addendum A); once as a motion 
for summary judgment in this case (R. at 134); and once as a motion for 
reconsideration in this case (R. at 590). 
• As evidence of intent to harass and punish Douglas, Nipper named Douglas' 
grandchildren, who ranged in age from 8 to 12 years old, as defendants in this 
aotiorr; zv&i tatMgh^ccording to the Complaint they hadrmy conn€CtioH^vilfe-*h& 
consignment dealarship. R. at 1. 
This Court addressed a similar violation of Rule 11 in Schoney v. Memorial 
Estates, Inc., 863 P.2d 59 (Utah App. 1993). 
In Schoney, a losing plaintiff filed a motion for class certification after the case 
had already been fiilly decided, which the court stated was "no different from filing a new 
complaint containing the original claims. Schoney, 863 P.2d at 60, footnote 1. As in 
Schoney, the plaintiff in this case attempted to relitigate a case that has been fully and 
finally adjudicated. In an attempt to get a better ruling than he received in the Frederick 
Action, Nipper filed an identical motion for summary judgment that had been twice 
denied by Judge Frederick. This Court noted in Schoney, "no proper purpose can be 
justified by ignoring the rulings of foregoing tribunals." Id., 863 P.2d at 62. The court 
emphasized that Rule 11 was designed to prevent just this type of abuse. Id, at 62. 
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Just as Schoney's motion was unconscionable in its attempt to relitigate her case, 
Mr. Nipper's motion in this case was an unconscionable attempt to overturn the decision 
by Judge Fredericks, a judge of equal authority. If Mr. Nipper wants to challenge the 
decision of Judge Frederick, the proper avenue is to challenge through the appellate 
courts, which Nipper will have the opportunity to do. 
Mr. Nipper attempts to distinguish this case from the Frederick Case by initiating 
claims of a new plaintiff along with his own. Schoney attempted essentially the same 
thing by trying to certify a class after losing on her own claims, but the court in Schoney 
rejected that attempt as frivolous and without reason. Simply put, Nipper had no basis in 
law for trying his motion fc^^immary-jiidgmeHt inches case. Rule 11, as explained by 
Schoney demands that Nipper and his attorneys be sanctioned for filing the motion for 
summary judgment after a decision had already been reached (twice) by another court of 
equal authority. R. at 488, 490. Because the identical claims and facts were brought in 
multiple courts, and because of the other indications of intent to cause needless increase 
in the cost of litigation and to harass Douglas, sanctions were and are appropriate 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT ATTORNEY'S FEES 
FOR NIPPER FILING A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL 
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure requires an award damages if an 
appeal is frivolous or for delay. U.RApp.P., 33(a). This appeal is both frivolous and 
brought for the purpose of delay, and attorney's fees should be granted to Douglas. 
A frivolous appeal is one not grounded in fact or warranted by existing law. 
U.R.App.P., 33(b). This Court has held that a frivolous appeal is "one having no 
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reasonable legal or factual basis as defined in Rule 40(a) [of the Rules of the Utah Court 
of Appeals—now the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure]/5 Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 
365, 369 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 
1987)). As such, Nipper's appeal if frivolous because (1) Nipper's arguments are not 
grounded in fact or are contrary to the facts, and (2) Nipper provides no authority for his 
legal arguments. 
Chief examples of Nipper asserting arguments not grounded in fact include the 
following: 
• Nipper's entire first half of his Statement of the Case is without citation to the 
'S&j&f&c Ayyellant's Br. at 5-8. 
• Nipper argues, "the RICO and Civil Conspiracy Claims are not in the Frederick 
Case" Appellant's Br. at 15. Nipper also argues, "whether Douglas was involved 
in RICO and Civil Conspiracy activities was not fully and fairly litigated in the 
Fredericks Case. 7/ was not even pled in that case " Appellant's Br. at 23 
(emphasis added). The Complaint in the Frederick Case, however, contains a 
claim for civil conspiracy and charges Douglas with engaging in racketeering 
activities, a RICO violation. R. at 468. 
• Several times Nipper argues he did not know about the RICO and civil conspiracy 
claims when he filed his Complaint in the Frederick Action (Appellant's Br. at 6, 
11,12, 15, 21), but he does not accurately cite to one instance where his 
knowledge of such claims was even at issue or mentioned. See Appellant's Br. at 
2-3. 
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• Nipper includes the issue of amending the Final Order to be without prejudice, 
even though trial court already amended the Final Order to comply with Nipper's 
interests. Appellant's Br. at 24; R. at.640. 
• Nipper uses a newspaper clipping, which doesn't even mention Nipper or a 1957 
Chevrolet, as the sole fact to back up his argument that res judicata should apply 
against Douglas in favor of Nipper. Appellant's Br. at 13 (paragraph 28), 23, 
Addendum C. 
Likewise Nipper's following legal arguments lack any authority: 
• Nipper argues the Frederick Action is not finalized, but does not offer any 
explana&ga QS a^uih&rity as-to the* accuracy of the statement. Appellant's B r , ^ 
14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 23. 
• Nipper argues res judicata applies to Remember When (Appellant's Br. at 12 
(paragraph 17) but not Nipper because the Frederick Action is ongoing, even 
though both orders come from the Frederick Action and neither has been certified 
ready for appeal. Addendum B. 
• Nipper argues his RICO and civil conspiracy claims rest upon a different set of 
facts (Appellant's Br. at 21), yet he never explains what those facts are. 
• Nipper argues the Ludwigs were not privies with Nipper but offers no analysis 
regarding why Nipper, who was allegedly assigned Ludwigs' claims, was not in 
privity with the Ludwigs. (Appellant's Br. at 17). 
Clearly Nipper's factual and legal arguments lack substance and authority. 
Although sanctions under Rule 33 are only granted in egregious cases, this is such a case. 
40 
Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365 (Utah App. 1988). In Porco, this Court noted, sanctions 
should be imposed when "an appeal is obviously without any merit and has been taken 
with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the 
judgment of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; and dissipation of the time and 
resources of the Law Court." IcL, at 369 (quoting Auburn Harpswell Ass'n v. Day, 438 
A.2d 234, 239 (ME 1981). 
In this case Nipper has not come close to providing this Court with enough 
accurate facts, legal reasoning, and citation to authority to have any reasonable likelihood 
of prevailing. In the meantime, Douglas has not been able to collect on the judgment in 
ifeeirial court (R. at 561), and this appeel hasdissipated $ha.-&me and resources of this 
Court. 
In addition to being a frivolous appeal, this appeal was instituted as means of 
delay. A purpose for delay is found if the appeal if for an improper purpose such as to 
harass to cause needless increase in the cost of litigation. U.R.App.P., 33(b). 
This Court in Eames v. Eames, 735 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah App. 1987) stated, 
'"when there is no basis for the argument presented and when the evidence or law is 
mischaracterized and misstated, the Court must question the party's motives." Nipper's 
brief in this case demonstrates a complete lack of substance and effort on Nipper's part. 
Appellant's Brief contains at most five pages of actual argument, all of which is nothing 
more than conclusory statements without any real analysis. Yet to protect himself 
Douglas must spend the time and money to prepare a full responsive brief. 
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Nipper so emotionally involved in this case he will never give up unless this Court 
explains it to him in monetary terms. This Court should grant sanctions against Nipper 
pursuant to Rule 33 in the full amount of attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reject all issues presented and affirm the 
trial court's orders and judgment pertaining to Douglas. Furthermore, in accordance with 
Rule 33, this Court should award sanctions in favor of Douglas and remand to the trial 
court for a determination of the full amount of costs and attorney's fees incurred by 
Douglas. 
DATED t h i s / 7 ^ i a y of X , / ^ , 2003 
Preston S 
Attorney for John H. Douglas 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. NIPPER, 
Plaintiff(s), 
vs. 
JOHN DOUGLAS, et al, 
Defendant<s) , 
MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
CASE NO. 990904084 CN 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
Date: February 27, 2002 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
t o Submit for Decision filed February 20, 2002, the Court rules as 
follows: 
1. This Court has previously declined to reconsider its 
ruling of December 17, 2001. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. NIPPER, 
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vs. 
JOHN DOUGLAS, et al, 
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MINUTE ENTRY RULING 
CASE NO. 990904084 CN 
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Date: September 5, 2002 
After review of the pleadings and upon receipt of the Notice 
to Submit for Decision filed August 26, 2002, the Court rules as 
follows: 
1. This Court declines to reconsider its decision not to 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. NIPPER 
Plaintiff 
v. 
JOHN DOUGLAS, individually, 
RICHARD A. NICHOLS, individually 
REMEMBER WHEN . . . , and T.D. 
ENTERPRISES, L.L.C, 
Defendants 
Order on Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment against 
Defendant Remember When 
Civil No. 990904084 
Judge: Dennis J. Frederick 
Pursuant to the Court's minute entry ruling of June 8, 2001 on the Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment against Defendant Remember When, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Remember When is 
granted. 
DATED this day of JliM ,2001. 
THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
jd I hereby certify that on the /£ffi-day of^/cc^x^ *Sfl<i>/ I caused a true 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be \s mailed, postage prepaid; and/or hand-delivered 
by fax and/or by courier; addressed to: 
Jacquelynn D. Carmichael 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Samuel McVey 
1800 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 45120 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID E. NIPPER 
Plaintiff 
JOHN DOUGLAS, individually, 
RICHARD A. NICHOLS, individually 
REMEMBER WHEN . . . , and T.D. 
ENTERPRISES, L.L.C, 
Defendants 
Judgment for Plaintiff against 
Defendant Remember When 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OFJyDQMENlS 
DATE 
Civil No. 990904084 
Judge: Dennis J. Frederick 
In this action, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment against Defendant Remember 
When was granted by a minute entry ruling of June 8,2001, and subsequently an order as to that 
minute entry was submitted to the Court on June 14,2001. Based on such order having been duly 
signed and entered according to law, now upon the application of said Plaintiff to the above-
entitled Court, Judgment against said Defendant Remember When pursuant to the prayer of the 
complaint and other Court orders is appropriate. 
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law, and by reason of the aforesaid, it is ordered, 
adjudged and decreed that said Plaintiff does recover from Defendant Remember When the 
following: 
1. The principal amount of $22,000.00. 
Judgment for Plaintiff Against Defendant 
2. Interest on the principal amount at the legal rate of 8.052% from October 15,1998, 
both before and after judgment, until paid in full; 
3. Court costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in obtaining the judgment in the 
amount of $6,144.00, which fees and costs are supported by the accompanying amended affidavit 
of costs and attorneys fees of counsel. 
4. Interest on item 3 at the legal interest rate of 8.052% from the date of judgment until 
paid in full. 
5. Consequential and incidental damages of $14,050.00, representing the amount of 
attorneys fees and costs incurred by Plaintiff to be represented by counsel in another court action, 
Ludwig v. Nipper, et al, Third District Court, Sandy Department, Case # 990407964, which was 
occasioned by Remember When's failure to comply with its contract with Plaintiff. Said fees 
and costs are supported and set forth within the amended affidavit of costs and attorneys fees. 
6. Interest on item 5 at the legal interest rate of 8.052 % from the date of judgment until 
paid in full. 
7. Court costs and reasonable attorneys fees incurred in collection of the judgment, which 
amount will be supported at a later date by an affidavit of counsel. 
